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T
he Federal Reserve’s discount window 
has long served as an important safety 
valve in the financial system, provid-
ing overnight loans to financial institu-
tions to cover temporary changes in deposits 
and loan portfolios during the normal course 
of business and supplying liquidity to financial 
markets during systemic stress. Over the course 
of the current crisis, this role expanded beyond 
conventional boundaries when the Federal Reserve 
introduced new lending facilities through the 
discount window to provide liquidity and cred-
it to dysfunctional markets. To supplement the 
new lending programs and further encourage 
borrowing from the discount window, the Fed-
eral Reserve also cut the discount rate, which 
is the primary credit rate charged to financial 
institutions for overnight loans.
  The  Term  Auction  Facility  (TAF),  intro-
duced in December 2007 and expanded in 2008, 
is administered through the discount windows 
at  all  Reserve  Banks.  Through  the  auctions, 
depository  institutions  borrow  from  the  Fed-
eral Reserve for a fixed term against the same 
collateral accepted by the discount window’s 
primary credit program. The rate is determined 
at auction, subject to a minimum set by the Fed-
eral Reserve. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York over-
sees the majority of the other discount window 
lending facilities that were introduced in 2008, 
such  as  the  Term  Securities  Lending  Facility, 
which provides liquidity in the U.S. Treasury 
and  other  securities  markets,  and  the  Com-
mercial Paper Funding Facility, which provides 
liquidity to short-term funding markets for U.S. 
issuers of commercial paper. 
Since January 2003, primary credit had been 
targeted at 100 basis points above the Federal 
Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) target fed-
eral funds rate. As the financial picture weak-
ened,  the  FOMC  reduced  the  federal  funds 
target eight times in 2008. The Federal Reserve 
also narrowed the primary credit spread above 
the federal funds rate target to  1/ 4 percentage 
point, resulting in a discount rate of .50 percent 
by  year-end.  Equally  important,  the  Federal 
Reserve lifted the 30-day term limit for primary 
credit to 90 days. 
With Markets in Turmoil, Twelfth District Banks  
Relied on Discount Window for Funding in 2008
Following the introduction of TAF and the 
cut in the primary credit rate, activity skyrock-
eted at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco’s discount window in 2008. At the start of 
the year, the auctions offered $30 billion with 
28-day maturities. As credit markets tightened 
further in 2008, the auctions became a perma-
nent fixture on a biweekly schedule, with the 
addition  of  84-day  maturity  loans  and  an  in-
crease in the amount auctioned to $150 billion. 
During  2008,  with  no  other  stable  source 
of  funding  available,  many  institutions  in 
the  Twelfth  District  turned  to  the  discount   
Credit and Risk Management
The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s Credit and Risk Manage-
ment staff oversee the discount window. The group nearly doubled 
in size from late 2007 through year-end 2008 to process the unprece-
dented volume of collateral pledges and loans and to monitor troubled 
institutions. Given the high volume, the group coordinated the on-site 
inspections of collateral, receipt of daily liquidity reports for troubled 
institutions, and review of collateral proposals, among other activities, 
with assistance from the Banking Supervision and Regulation and Le-
gal departments. 
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window. At  the  end  of  2007,  190  institutions 
with  relationships  with  the  Twelfth  District’s 
discount window had pledged $72.8 billion of 
collateral  toward  loans.  Six  months  later,  the 
number increased to 207 depository institutions 
with collateral pledges of $98.8 billion. By the 
end of 2008, 305 institutions had established re-
lationships with the District’s discount window, 
pledging $173.5 billion in collateral to support 
their liquidity needs. 
During the year, as relationships and collat-
eral pledges with the discount window rose, 
lending activity spiked. In 2007, the District’s 
discount window originated 283 loans totaling 
$3.6 billion, principally from the primary credit 
program. In the first half of 2008, following the 
cut in the primary credit rate and the expansion 
of the term limits for TAF, the number of loans 
more than tripled, with the discount window 
generating 903 loans totaling $79.3 billion. The 
O
ne  rapid  response  to  the  financial 
crisis came from the San Francisco 
Fed’s Statistics Division. With only 
three weeks of lead time, the Divi-
sion implemented a new policy to pay interest 
on  reserve  balances  depository  institutions 
hold in accounts at the Federal Reserve. The 
change, which took effect in October 2008, pro-
vided the Federal Reserve with a tool designed 
to  let  it  expand  new  lending  facilities  while 
achieving its federal funds interest rate target 
for monetary policy.
latter part of year continued to set new records 
for the number and value of advances made. 
By year-end 2008, Twelfth District’s discount 
window  had  extended  3,190  loans  totaling 
$389.3 billion, the highest loan volume in the 
Federal Reserve System. 
The  Twelfth  District’s  discount  window 
also monitored a significantly greater number 
of troubled institutions during the year as the 
crisis  intensified.  Consequently,  staff  imple-
mented a broad range of traditional and innova-
tive risk controls to manage credit risk exposure 
at  each  institution.  For  example,  some  banks 
with  impaired  capital  levels  were  no  longer 
eligible  for  TAF  funds,  long-term  borrowing, 
and  intraday  overdraft  ceilings.  Additionally, 
certain banks were required to post transactions 
in real-time to their Federal Reserve accounts to 
ensure they monitored their balances through-
out the day. 
Although the Financial Services Regulatory 
Relief Act of 2006 had already authorized inter-
est payments, the change wasn’t scheduled to 
begin until October 1, 2011. Congress approved 
the accelerated schedule with the passage the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 
Banks are required to hold a portion of cus-
tomer  deposits  in  Federal  Reserve  accounts. 
As the manager of the computer system used 
by all Reserve Banks to calculate these reserve 
requirements,  the  Statistics  Division  led  the 
integration  of  the  new  policy  to  pay  interest 
on both required and excess reserve balances. 
San Francisco also serves as headquarters for 
the  central  bank’s  national  Reserve  Resource 
Center, which provided reserve administration 
expertise for the transition. 
To meet the accelerated schedule, technical 
specialists within the Statistics Division modi-
fied one of the central bank’s largest and most 
complex  computer  systems  within  a  narrow 
window of just three weeks. Nearly 7,000 insti-
tutions—ranging  from  depository  institutions 
and trusts to U.S. branches and agencies of for-
eign banks—became eligible to earn interest on 
their reserve balances.
What is the link between paying interest on 
bank reserves and monetary policy? 
Prior to the payment of interest on reserves, banks typi-
cally lent excess balances (above required reserves) in the 
overnight federal funds market to earn interest. By pay-
ing interest on bank reserves, the Fed now provides an 
incentive for institutions to hold these excess balances in 
reserve accounts at the Fed, and the interest rate paid on 
reserves tends to set a floor on the interest rate available in 
the funds market. Thus, the Fed may be able to maintain 
its monetary policy target rate for federal funds even as 
it expands excess reserves through new lending facilities. 
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